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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

BEN J. WAUNEKA,

:

Case No. 14306

Defendant-Appellant
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ben J. Wauneka, appeals from a jury verdict of
guilty of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced
to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for the term provided for
by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment thereon and an order directing the case be remanded to the
Third Judicial Court with directions to dismiss or in the alternative
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was found guilty in the lower court of the crime
of manslaughter.

The charge against the defendant arose out of the

death of his wife.
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The defendant Ben J. Wauneka and his wife, Rose Marie Wauneka
resided at 1229 Stringham Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.

On

January 22, 1975, at approximately 8:00 a.m. the appellant, Ben J.
Wauneka, called the police department and requested ambulance
service.

Upon their arrival, the authorities found the appellantfs

wife, Rose Marie Wauneka, on the couple's bed with bruises about
her body.
On further investigation by the Salt Lake City Police Department,
it was discovered that articles of clothing were in the bathtub,
paper toweling in the wastebasket of the bedroom and a wash cloth in the
sink in the bathroom.

There appeared to be blood stains on a bra that

was found in the bathtub, on the bed sheets upon which Mrs. Wauneka
was lying, and on the paper toweling found in the wastebasket.
Conversations with the appellant revealed that both he and
his wife were alcoholics and on the night of January 21, 1975, they
had both engaged in a considerable amount of drinking.
The appellant at all times denied striking his wife and told
of how they became very intoxicated on the night of January 22, 1975,
and Mrs. Wauneka fell down twice while she was walking from the
kitchen to the bedroom.

A combination of the fall and the drinking

rendered her condition such that she was unable to stand and the
defendant sat her against the end of the bed and tried to bring her
around by pouring water on her.

The defendant being intoxicated went
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to sleep on the bed and did not wake up until the following morning
and then became concerned about the condition of his wife and
placed her on the bed and called the authorities.
A physical inspection of the Wauneka home by the police found
no object that could have been used to strike Rose Marie Wauneka
and an inspection by Detective Saunders of the appellant's hands
revealed no evidence that would be consistent with hands that had
been used to deliver numerous blows.
At no time did the State offer any evidence showing that the
defendant committed any wrongful act that resulted in the death of
Rose Marie Wauneka.

The entire case was submitted to the jury

on the strength of the medical testimony that in his opinion some of
the bruises was the result of blows by a human fist.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO
INTRODUCE STATEMENTS MADE BY DECEASED ROSE MARIE
WAUNEKA.
The testimony of April Dahl and Regina Saunders called by
the State mostly related to conversations they had with the deceased
Rose Marie Wauneka several days prior to the day she died.

The

introduction of these statements were objected to by the appellant
but the trial court permitted the statements to come in on the theory
that the statements could be used for the limited purpose to show her
then existing state of mind and fear of the appellant.

-3-
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The trial

court relied on Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (12)(a) which is
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
An example of the statements complained of are as follows
in the direct examination of April Dahl:
Q.

And what did she say:

Brown: Objection on the basis of hearsay.
Court:
A.

Overruled.

I asked her what was the matter and she said "you call

the police for me" and I said "Well, Rose, why don't you call the
police, there is a phone right over there," and she said "no" she
says, "I can't, if Ben finds out I called the police, he'll kill
me." (T.138)
Q.

You say she didn't inform you why she wanted you to call

the police, is that correct?
Brown:

Your Honor, this is repetitious, she's already answered

that question.

Mr. Yocom is now leading his witness.

Court: Objection will be overruled.
A.

She did, I'm sorry, she did, I'm rattled.

Q.

Just try and relax, April, I know its a tense situation.

When did this occur in the conversation?
A.

At the very first, she said "Ben's beating me" and you

know she said you call the police" and I said "Rose, why don't you
call the police because I'm at work, it's not good to do that" and
she says "no, he'll kill me if he finds out I made the phone call"
so that's -- (T.139)
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The followind direct examination of Regina Saunders is another
example of prejudicial statements that should have been excluded
by the trial court:
Q.

Now this conversation took place in English between

the two of you?
A.

Both English and Navajo.

Q.

Did she speak Navajo?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And I assume you do, too.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you say to her with regard to her physical

condition?
A.

I just asked her what was the matter with her and she said

thatBrown:

Your Honor, this is not proper, this does not come

within the rules that the Court has mentioned, this is a question
and answer situation.

The rules that the Court--we have been

discussing is a declaration by one person and this is not the
situation at all, I would object to it.
Court:

Objection to the last question will be sustained.

Yocom:

Did she say anything to you about her physical or

mental condition at that time?
Brown:

Objection, your Honor, leading.

Yocom:

O.K. Answer that yes or no.

Court:

Objection overruled.

Yes.
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Yocom:

And what did she tell you?

Brown:

Objection, Your Honor.

Court:

Overruled.

Yocom:

Go ahead.

A.

Well, she just said that, you know, about her bruises that

she was -- her husband, she was her husband's punching bag or
something.
Q.

Do you recall exactly what she said to you?

A.

Well she said that, I asked her how she got all the bruises

and she said that her husband beat her up and I asked her, of course
I have seen her quite a few times that way and she has never told
me just how those happened but that time she did, she said that I'm
just his punching bag.
Brown:

I object and move to have that stircken

Court:

Objection overruled.
(T. 192-193)

Even though there is not an abundance of law in Utah on the
percise issue raised here it is clear from the rulings in other
jurisdictions and discussions by recognized authorities that the
lower Court should have excluded the declarations of Mr. Wauneka.
Briefly state, the state of mind exception to the hearsay
rule allows such statements to show future intent of the declarant
to perform an act if that act is at issue.
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 63 (12)(a) of the

It is also well established that some

evidence while bearing some logical relevance to the case, may be
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excluded where, in the discretion
of the judge its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion.

Rule 45 Utah Rules of Evidence.

"In a case where . . . the

danger of harm from improper use by the jury of the offered
declaration is substantial, the judge's discretion to exclude
the declaration has been recognized".

McCormick on Evidence,

Sec. 294 at 696 (2d Ed. 1972).
The threshold requirement of admissibility of hearsay statements
of the declarant's "fear of the defendant" in homicide cases is some
substantial degree of relevance to a material issue in the case.
Such relevance has historically been found by courts when the
defendant has raised the defense of self-defense or suicide.
However, when no such defenses are raised, the declarant's (deceased's)
state of mind is not an issue.

As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated

in State v. Kump, 76-Wyo. 273, 301 P.2d 808 (1956):
The attitude of the mind of deceased toward the defendant
as evidenced by outward manifestations, such as
declarations, is at times relevant when the defendant
pleads self-defense. [citations] In such case the
attitude of mind is to show the hostile attitude of
the deceased which would justify self-defense or perhaps
reduce the degree of the crime, or the severity of the
sentence. That is not the situation in the case at
bar. The important fact here is the attitude of the mind
of the defendant, not that of the deceased. The attitude
of mind of the deceased toward the defendant was immaterial,
(emphasis in original)
The court, therefore, held inadmissable, in spite of a limiting
instruction by the trial judge that the jury not consider testimony
except as "tending to show the attitude of mind of the deceased
towards the defendant," hearsay statements relating to various threats
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Made by the defendant toward the deceased.
People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580 (1969), offers
another example of judicial unwillingness to extend the state of mind
exception to include declarations of the deceased where deceased's
state of mind was not in issue.

There, the prosecution offered to

show that the deceased had said prior to her death, "I know he's
going to kill me.11 The prosecution urged that this was admissible
as bearing on the victim's state of mind which was relevant to
"show the probabilities of the decedent's conduct . . . that she
would not have done anything to provoke him."

The defense argued

that the deceased's state of mind was not relevant to any issue
in the case.

The California Supreme Court agree, holding that the

"acts or conduct of the declarant . . . at the time of the homicide
were simply not in dispute."
raised in the case.

There was no defense of self-defense

"In such circumstances it must be concluded

that the hearsay statement . . . was improperly admitted into
evidence."

Ld. at 585.

Some courts have recognized that the deceased's state of mind
might be relevant when the defendant claims the death was accidental
but only when the declaration of the state of mind in some way
negates the claim of accidental death--as when the defense
claims deceased dies as a result of accidental misfiring of a
weapon she was handling and the declaration was that the deceased
was afraid of guns and would not, therefore, be likely to have been
handling one.

Such considerations are not present here. Mrs.

Wauneka's claim that she was afraid of her husband because he had been
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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beating her does not speak to the issue of her sustaining her fatal
injuries by accident. It, therefore, does not qualify under this
theory of the exception's applicability.
Even when the court does recognize that the decedent's state of
mind has some relevance, where the risk of prejudice of an exceptionally
damning nature is high, even a substantial amount of relevance is
outweighed.

For example, in People v. Lew, 68 Cal. 2d 774, 441 P.2d

942 (1968), the trial court's admission of a variety of hearsay
statements of the victim, including a number of alleged threats made
by the defendant, was held to be error by the California Supreme
Court.

The court first analyzed the issues to determine if the

statements were relevant to any inquiry necessary to the case.
It found that they were relevant to the defendant's claim that the
victim had been handling the gun when it went off accidentally and
killed her in that it rebutted the liklihood that she would do so
because of her fear of guns and of the defendant.

Nevertheless,

the court held that it was error to have admitted the testimony
since it implied past misconduct on the part of the defendant and
was also essentially unreliable.

The court stated that "such

testimony is not admissable . . . because to try to separate state of
mind from the truth of the charges is an almost impossible task."
Id.

at 945.
The Lew case relied principally on People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.

2d 881, 362 P.2d 473 (1961).

In Hamilton, the only question was

-9-
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whether the defendant had committed first or second degree murder.
He admitted killing the deceased, but claimed it had been done
without pre-meditation and deliberation and that he had gone to the
victim's house at her invitation.

In rebuttal the prosecution

introduced over the object of defendant statements made by the wife
to witnesses that she was afraid of the defendant, that he had beaten
her and that he had threatened to kill her.

The jury was carefully

instructed not to consider these statements as true as to the beatings,
but only as state of mind evidence.

The Supreme Court nevertheless

held it error to admit such testimony since the state of mind was
necessarily dependent on some past acts of the defendant that were very
prejudicial to his case and that it was beyond the jury's power to
distinguish the purposes for which the evidence was admitted.
In an exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion, the D.C. circuit
court examined the st&te of mind exception as it had developed at
common law and under both the Uniform Rules of Evidence (which are
used in Utah) and the Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts,
and came to the conclusion:
The rule then to be distilled from the better reasoned
decisions is that a victim's extra-judicial declarations of
fear of the defendant are admissible under the stateof mind
exception to the hearsay rule with a limiting instruction only
if there is a manifest need for such evidence, i.e., if it
is relevant to a material issue in the case. Where there is
a substantial liklihood of prejudice to the defendant's case
in the admission of such testimony, it is inadmissible
if it bears only a remote or artificial relationship to
the legal or factual issues raised in the case. Even where
there is substantial relevance, the additional factual
matters in the statement may simply be too explosive to be
contained by the limiting instruction, in which case
exclusion of the testimony is also necessitated.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In Brown the court carefully analyzed all the relevant factors
that a court should use to determine the admissibility of hearsay
testimony sought to be introduced under the exception in question.
The court focused in particular upon the problem of statements that
not only exhibit the declarent's state of mind, but which also
narrate details of past misconduct by the defendant; statements like
Mrs. Wauneka's "Ifm afraid of my husband because he beats me and I
think he is going to kill me.,f

The court emphasized that:

One of the principal concerns voiced in the cases revolves
around state of mind testimony that is inextricably bound
up with the relation of past events or conduct on the part
of the accused. Rarely does the testimony stop at the point
"I am afraid of D." More often it is express: "I'm
afraid of D because he beat me and threatened to kill me.11
Most courts are rightly leary of such testimony since it
trenches closely upon the Shepard doctrine. (Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96 [1933]). After Shepard,
it has been unquestionably accepted that to allow hearsay
statements which relate past events on memory or belief
under the state of mind exception would in effect swallow
the hearsay rule. Therefore no court would admit such
testimony for the purpose of proving the truth of the
matter alleged, yet many will accept it if introduced solely
on the state of mind issue with a limiting instruction.
But, as in Shepard, when such statements bear close proximity
to the issue of guilty or innocence it is equally clear that
the limiting instruction may be of dubious utility at best.
Thus the more narration of past acts or conduct of the defendant
in the statement, the greater the danger of jury misuse.
Where the external facts in the statement are so inflammatory
as to unduly arouse the jury's emotions of prejudice of
hostility, any evidence, whether or not involving state of
mind issues, must be excluded where its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its unduly dramatic or emotional
impact so as to create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.
Id. at 775-77.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court's position here is consistent with the majority of
jurisdictions which have rules upon this question.

See, for example,

State v. Bartolon, 495 P.2d 772 (Ore. 1972), Brown v. People,
273 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1954) Commonwealth v. Lippert, 311 A.2d 586 (Pa.
1973), Rule 55 Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs.
In summary, the state of mind exception is applicable only
when the declarant's own state of mind is a material issue in the
case, even if it is an issue, prejudicial statements contained in the
declaration should be excluded.

It is important to bear in mind that

in the instant case, Mrs. Wauneka's highly prejudicial remarks in no
way contributed to a needed understanding of her conduct because her
conduct is not an issue.

The use of such, statements only served to

prejudice the defendant's case by placing before the jury unsubstantiated claims of prior misconduct by the defendant.
It is obvious that Mr. Yocom the states attorney never
intended to use the statements for the limited purpose of showing
Mrs. Wauneka's state of mind.

The following remark in Mr. Yocom's

closing argument clearly shows that he intended to show prior unproven
bad acts as evidence that the defendant committed the act in
question*:
But how about that is that simple enough to hit hard,
hit and hit and hit repeatedly and not have cuts on those
knuckles? Very simple, I suppose that if you are as
experienced in wife beating as I think the evidence has
shown...
Brown: Objection your honor, this is improper argument and I
would move the court to have the jury disregard the last
statement of counsel.
Court: Objection is overruled
(T.317)
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE THAT TENDED TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED"^
CRIME ON ANOTHER SPECIFIED OCCASION PRIOR TO THE ACT IN
QUESTION.
The lower court not only allowed hearsay statements of the
deceased to be considered by the jury but at the same time compounded
the

prejudicial error by permitting witnesses to describe Mrs.

Wauneka1s physical appearance.

The evidence complained of is as follows:

Tr. 137 April Dahl
Q.

Would you describe first of all, April the physical appearance

of Rose Wauneka, what she looked like.
Brown:

Objection, your Honor, not material.

Court:

Overruled.

A.

She had very puffy eyes, that were red from crying and she

had a bruise on the right side of her facfe up high around the cheekbone and she was very shook, very uptight, she was shaking, in fact,
when she was handing me some money.
Tr. 191, Regia Betonney
Q.

Did you observe anything unusual about her physical condition?

Brown:

Objection, not material, your Honor.

Court:

Overruled.

Yocom:

You may answer that question.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Could you describe that for us?

A.

She had bruises all over her, she had one on her cheek, chin,

one on the forehead and she had bruises on her arms.
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The above questions and answers could be used by the jury for
only one purpose and that would be to show that the defendant committed
assaults on the deceased on prior occasions.

It is clear that

evidence of other crimes of civil wrongs is prohibited by Utah
Rules of Evidence Rule 55 which states:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48,
such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove
some other material fact including absence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.
In the case of State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d, 219, 418 P.2d 978
(1966) the Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion held that the
lower court erred in permitting witnesses to testify to a similar,
unproven offense.

The reasoning in the Huggins is stated by Justice

Henroid as follows:
The prejudice engendered by permitting this witness to
testify, informing the jury that her mother had filed a
similar charge against defendant that very day, seems to
us to have been an incurable prejudice that could have been
the difference between a reasonable doubt and a foregone
conclusion in the minds of the veniremen.
The argument that the modern trend is to allow evidence
of other similar offenses to show a propensity, was
supported by and large by cases where evidence of previous
convictions was extant and admissible to support the view.
Here there was no conviction of the charge leveled by
this witness1 mother the day of the trial. For aught we
know, such charge may have resulted in acquittal the
next day. Had it been tried before this case, and an
acquittal had resulted, no one would have ventured the
suggestion that such an acquittal could have been used to
help convict the defendant in the instant case. In the
aggregate, the error here was prejudicial requiring a new
trial. (Emphasis
in original)
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It is contended that the error committed in the instant case
is even more compelling than the error committed in the Huggins,
case.

In the instant case substantial evidence of prior unproven

assaults came in by way of hearsay statements not subject to
cross-examination.
P.2d citation:

As stated by Justice Henroid on page 221 of

"For aught we know, such charge may have resulted

in an acquittal the next day.11
The description of Mrs. Wauneka1 s physical condition coupled
with her hearsay statements complained of in Point No. 1 would
seem to be "an incurable prejudice that could have been the difference
between a reasonable doubt and a foregoin conclusion in the minds
of the venireman."

State v. Huggins, supra.
POINT III

THE COURT ERRORED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY
AND TO PERMIT THE JURY TO SPECULATE UPON THE GUlET
OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT?
A review of the record will reveal a complete lack of evidence
that the defendant committed any wrongful act that resulted in the
death of Mrs. Wauneka.

The very weak medical testimony that a

human fist could have been used to deliver blows to the deceased
is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
some act that resulted in the unfortunate death of Mrs. Wauneka.
The case of State v. Bassett 495 P.2d 318, 27 Utah 2d 272 (1972)
is directly in point with the instant case.

In the Bassett case the Utah

Supreme Court on page 275 Utah Reports stated:
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In this case there being no evidence to show any act
on the part of the defendants or either of them, it was
error for the court to submit the case to the jury
to speculate upon the guilt or innocence of the
defendants.
To permit a conviction to stand on the caliber of
evidence produced in the Bassett

case and the instant case would

tend to disregard the burden of proof required in the criminal justice
system.

The degree of proof would be reduced to the standards required

in a mere tort action instead of beyond a reasonable doubt required in
a criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Based on the lack of evidence and the erroneous rulings
of the lower court relating to hearsay declarations and prior misconduct
it is compelling that the error committed bg corrected so that
the Utah Rules of Evidence are better understood.
Respectfully submitted,

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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